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Abstract
This paper proposes a method for the welfare analysis of pay-as-you-go social security
systems. We derive a formula for the welfare consequences of a permanent marginal change
in the payroll tax rate that is valid under weak assumptions about the deep structure of the
economy. Our approach requires neither a full specification of preferences and technology,
nor knowledge of the individual savings behavior. Instead of parameterizing and calibrating
the deep model structure, we implement our formula based on reduced form estimates of
a VAR model. We apply our method to evaluate the social security system in the United
States.
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1 Introduction
Unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security systems play an important role in many de-
veloped countries’ social insurance programs. Since demographic changes and the associated
growing fraction of retirees in the population cause increasing financial stress for these systems,
the question of how to design social security systems optimally becomes more and more relevant.
Social security systems are typically studied in the context of structural overlapping genera-
tions (OLG) models (examples include: Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987; Imrohoroglu et al., 1995;
Kotlikoff et al., 1999; Krueger and Kubler, 2006; Kotlikoff et al., 2007; Nickel et al., 2008; Fehr
et al., 2012; McGrattan and Prescott, 2013; Gahramanov and Tang, 2013, among many others).1
Welfare analysis in these models proceeds in two steps: first, the deep structure of the model
(e.g., preferences and technology) is parameterized and the structural parameters are calibrated
or estimated. Second, the effect of different policies and alternative social security systems on
social welfare is computed using simulation methods. This approach provides a flexible frame-
work for the welfare analysis of competing social security systems. However, it features two
main drawbacks: first, even flexible functional form assumptions might be arbitrary and hard
to justify and second, it is typically difficult to identify and estimate all deep parameters in an
empirically compelling manner.
This paper contributes to the literature by proposing a complementary method for welfare
analysis of social security systems. Based on the Ramsey problem in an OLG model (cf. Dia-
mond, 1965) featuring endogenous labor supply and idiosyncratic longevity, we derive a simple
formula for the welfare consequences of permanent changes in payroll taxes used to finance
transfers in PAYGO systems. Our formula reveals that changes in the payroll tax affect welfare
through three distinct channels: (i) the direct effect of receiving more transfers and paying more
taxes, (ii) the general equilibrium effect through changes in factor prices, and (iii) the change
in transfers due to the labor adjustment of the subsequent generations. This decomposition
is related to the literature on generational accounting, in particular to Fehr et al. (1999) who
parameterize and calibrate an OLG model to assess the welfare effect through these different
channels.
Our main contribution is to propose an approach to identification and estimation of marginal
welfare changes that does not rely on parameterizing and calibrating the deep structure of the
model. We exploit the fact that our formula depends on few high level quantities (such as
1An important focus of these studies has been on shifts from a primarily unfunded system towards mixed
systems that combine PAYGO with investment based personal retirement accounts.
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future growth rates and impulse responses of wages and labor with respect to tax changes) and
marginal utilities only. This allows us to identify and estimate marginal welfare changes under
fewer parametric assumptions. In particular, we do not need to specify the functional form of
the aggregate production function nor to fully parameterize household preferences. Moreover,
relying on the envelope theorem, our formula for the welfare consequences does not depend on
individuals’ savings behavior.
We propose two different approaches to implementation of our formula, both of which rely
on the reduced form nature of the formula, but differ in their respective treatment of marginal
utilities. First, we consider approximate consumption equivalent impacts on each generation.
This approach does not require any additional assumptions regarding marginal utilities. How-
ever, it is uninformative about the overall welfare change associated with a marginal increase in
the payroll tax. We therefore develop a second approach for evaluating the overall effect. This is
achieved by obtaining a money metric of the welfare effect through an appropriate standardiza-
tion. Because the overall effect inherently requires a comparison of weighted marginal utilities
of different generations, we need to impose arguably weak assumptions on preferences and on
the generation’s welfare weights. We show that for both approaches to implementation of our
formula, welfare changes can be stated as functions of impulse response functions and predictions
of future growth rates only. This allows for an empirical implementation based on the reduced
form estimates of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Our approach can be extended along
various dimensions. In particular, we show that it may incorporate additional taxes that are
used to finance the PAYGO system and changes in the retirement age.
In addition to the literature cited earlier, the analysis in this paper is related to studies
focusing on globally optimal PAYGO systems (e.g., Feldstein, 1985; Imrohoroglu et al., 1995).
However, this paper has a somewhat different focus on local welfare improvements due to small
changes in the payroll tax.
Because our formula is a function of high level quantities rather than the deep structure of
the model, it can be interpreted as a sufficient statistic (in the sense of Chetty, 2009). The
sufficient statistic approach to welfare analysis has recently become important in the public
economics literature (see e.g. Chetty, 2009, for a review). It provides a middle course between
structural models and reduced-form methods. From the structural approach, it borrows the
ability to make predictions about welfare, but avoids the problem of having to estimate or
calibrate the deep parameters of the model. From the reduced-form approach, it borrows the
advantage of transparent and credible identification. Our analysis differs from the sufficient
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statistics literature with respect to the structure of the model and the implementation strategy.
We implement our central formula based on the reduced form estimates of a VAR because of the
dynamic general equilibrium nature of our evaluation problem. This contrasts existing studies
which mostly consider static partial equilibrium models and therefore rely on cross sectional
estimates as sufficient statistic; for example Card et al. (2007) and Chetty (2008, 2009).
We illustrate our approach by assessing the PAYGO system of the United States. Our
results suggest that, in terms of approximate consumption equivalents, a marginal increase in
the payroll tax raises welfare of today’s retirees and decreases welfare of today’s workers and
future generations.
The sign of the overall effect depends on the structure of the welfare weights of the Ramsey
planner. We first consider “politician’s” weights that only reflect the size of the current old and
young generations, with zero weights for future generations. We find that the estimated overall
welfare effect of a marginal increase in the payroll tax is negative for a broad range of values
for the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In contrast, if the welfare weights reflect the size
of all generations, aging, and discounting, then the sign of the overall effect is positive except
for high values of the Ramsey planner’s discount factor, i.e., the weight the planner attaches to
future generations. A decomposition by theoretical channels reveals that the direct effect and the
factor price effects (i.e., induced changes in wage and interest rates) are important determinants
of welfare changes while the effect through the adjustments in labor is negligible. A scenario
analysis confirms the robustness of our empirical findings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives
a formula for the welfare analysis of a change in the payroll tax. In section 3, we use this formula
to assess the welfare consequences of a change in the payroll tax for the United States. Section
4 concludes.
2 Theory
We consider an OLG model with endogenous labor supply and idiosyncratic longevity risk.
Our framework is closely related to the setups considered by Breyer and Straub (1993), Nourry
(2001), Fanti and Spataro (2006), Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008), Lopez-Garcia (2008), and
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2012). First, we discuss the problems of the household and the
representative firm. Second, we analyze the Ramsey problem of the benevolent government. We
derive a formula for the welfare consequences of a change in the payroll tax as a function of
4
reduced form quantities only. Third, we discuss extensions of our formula to richer economic
environments. Finally, we propose two approaches to empirically implement our formula.
2.1 Demographics, preferences and technology
We consider a perfectly competitive economy inhabited by an infinite sequence of overlapping
generations. Each generation lives for two periods. In the first period, households supply labor
elastically, 0 ≤ nt ≤ n̄.2 In the second period, they retire. Population grows at an exogenous
rate. Let Lt denote the size of the labor force (i.e., the size of the young generation) in period
t and define χt,z ≡ Lz/Lt − 1 as the working age population growth rate between two periods t
and z. We break the tight link between population growth and the ratio of workers to retirees by
assuming that households face idiosyncratic longevity (e.g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008,
2012): with exogenous probability pt+1 ∈ (0, 1], households born in t survive to become old
households in period t+ 1.3
Households have preferences over consumption in both periods and leisure lt = n̄ − nt.
Consumption in the first period, cyt , equals post tax labor income, ntwt(1−τt), where τt denotes
the payroll tax, minus savings st+1. In the second period, households consume cot+1, which is
equal to the gross returns on savings, st+1Rt+1/pt+1,4 plus lump sum social security benefits,
Tt+1.5 Preferences are summarized by the utility function u(c
y
t , n̄ − nt, cot+1) with ucy(·) > 0,
ul(·) > 0, uco(·) > 0, ucycy(·) < 0 and ucoco(·) < 0. Note that the utility function u(·) generally
depends on the exogenous survival probability pt+1. To ease the notation, we suppress this
dependence until section 2.5, where we impose additional structure on the preferences. The







u(cyt , n̄− nt, cot+1)








2n̄ denotes the number of available hours in a time period that can be split between leisure and work.
3The ratio of workers to retirees in period t is given by 1 +χt−1,t/pt. Thus, pt can be inferred from observed
working age population growth and the ratio of workers to retirees.
4Savings of young households who die before reaching old age are distributed among their surviving peers,
leaving them with a gross interest rate of Rt+1/pt+1.
5In principle, the budget of the retired households also includes profits of the firms. However, they will turn
out to be zero in equilibrium due to constant returns to scale. Therefore, we drop them in the households’
problem for notational simplicity.
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Let λyt and λot+1 be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint of the




t , n̄− nt, cot+1), (1)
λytwt(1− τt) = ul(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1), (2)
λot+1 = uco(c
y





The savings decision of a household in cohort t is given by the usual consumption Euler equation:
ucy(c
y





t , n̄− nt, cot+1). (5)
The labor supply is described by:
ucy(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1)wt(1− τt) = ul(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1). (6)
When making their decisions, households consider both current after-tax wages and future in-
terest rates Rt+1/pt+1, idiosyncratic longevity pt+1, and benefits Tt+1. (5) and (6) combined
with the household’s budget constraints map wt(1− τt), pt+1, Rt+1, and Tt+1 into savings and
labor supply:
st+1 = S(wt(1− τt), pt+1, Rt+1, Tt+1), (7)
nt = N(wt(1− τt), pt+1, Rt+1, Tt+1). (8)
The firm sector is characterized by a set of competitive firms that can be represented by an
aggregate production function F (Kt, HtEt), which maps inputs of capital Kt, exogenous labor
efficiency Et, and hours worked Ht = Ltnt into output. The problem of the firm is static. In
each period, the representative firm solves
max
Kt,Ht
F (Kt, HtEt)− wtHt − rtKt.
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The first order conditions of the firm problem imply:
wt = FHE(Kt, HtEt)Et, (9)
rt = FK(Kt, HtEt). (10)
We impose the following standard assumption on the aggregate production function.
Assumption 1. F (Kt, HtEt) exhibits constant returns to scale.
Note that Assumption 1 and the Euler theorem imply zero profits in equilibrium.
In addition to conditions from household and firm optimization, the following market clearing
and feasibility conditions hold in general equilibrium: Kt = stLt−1,Ht = ntLt and Rt = 1−δ+rt.
2.2 Ramsey program
We consider the program of a benevolent government that seeks to maximize social welfare,
W , subject to technological and competitive equilibrium constraints under commitment – the
Ramsey program. In contrast to the standard procedure, we do not solve for the optimal
sequence of payroll taxes. Instead, our goal is to derive an empirically implementable expression
for the welfare impact of a permanent change in the payroll tax, dW/dτ , that is a function of
empirically estimable high level elasticities.6
Under Assumption 1, the Ramsey program at t = 0 for a given sequence of welfare weights
{ξt} reads:
6We consider a permanent change in the payroll tax τ as a more realistic and important case than a one time
change in the tax rate, which would be a straightforward alternative to consider. Usually, we do not observe that
a government decides on a future path for τt, but rather that τ is set to some specific value that is supposed to
hold for the future, until important developments make another change in τ necessary. Most observed changes to
social security tax rates are permanent in the sense that, at the time of change, the government has no intention









t , n̄− nt, cot+1) + ξ−1u
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s0, χ−1,0, p0, E0, c
y
−1, n−1 given,
st+1 = S(wt(1− τt), pt+1, Rt+1, Tt+1) t ≥ 0,
nt = N(wt(1− τt), pt+1, Rt+1, Tt+1) t ≥ 0,
household budget constraints,
F (st, nt(1 + χt−1,t)Et) = (Rt − 1 + δ)st + wtnt(1 + χt−1,t) t ≥ 0,
wt = FHE(st, nt(1 + χt−1,t)Et)Et t ≥ 0,






We assume throughout that the sequence of welfare weights {ξt} is declining sufficiently fast
for the problem to be well defined. The last condition in (11) describes the PAYGO character
of the social security system in which retiree pensions are equal to the taxes collected divided
by the fraction pt of households that reach retirement age. Our framework does not require the
pension system to be balanced in every period. We show in section 2.3 and in appendix B that our
analysis can be extended to include additional taxes to refinance the PAYGO system.7 However,
allowing for government debt is challenging because the timing of taxes and transfers that
redistribute resources across generations matters in OLG models in which Ricardian equivalence
does not hold in general. While it is in principal possible to extend our framework to setups
where a known rule governs the evolution of government debt across periods, we consider such
an ad hoc approach as unsatisfactory. A general treatment of government debt in our framework
is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
Using the envelope conditions of the household maximization problem, the effect of a marginal














− wtntucy(cyt , n̄− nt, cot+1)ξt + Ψ, (12)
7The issue of refinancing PAYGO systems using general (non-payroll) taxes is subject to intensive debates
among researchers and policy makers, see for example the recent discussion and analysis in Gahramanov and
Tang (2013).
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where Ψ summarizes the general equilibrium effects of a change in τ . The first term in (12)
measures the direct welfare gain of old generations due to an increase in social security transfers.
The second term reflects the direct welfare loss of young generations caused by an increase in









− ucy(cyt , n̄− nt, cot+1)ξt.
Besides the direct redistributive effects, a change in τ has general equilibrium effects that are
captured in Ψ. The policy change causes changes in labor and savings and, thus, in the capital
stock, which in turn affects future wages, interest rates and, consequently, social welfare (for the









































Due to constant returns to scale, there is a direct relation between dRt/dτ and dwt/dτ that the
Ramsey planner takes into account. Totally differentiating the general equilibrium constraint

















8Labor efficiency Et is exogenous and therefore dEt/dτ = 0.
9











































It is worthwhile discussing the different channels of the overall welfare effect in more detail.
There are three basic components, each of which corresponds to a line in equation (14). First,
there is the direct effect of receiving more transfers and paying higher taxes. The initial old
generation benefits by receiving more transfers without having paid more taxes. All other
generations are affected by both higher tax rates when young and higher transfers when old.
Second, there are indirect welfare effects owing to the impact of the policy change on factor
prices. The effect of factor prices consists of three components: changes in the wage for the young
household, changes in the interest rate and changes in the wage that affect the old households
through transfers. Third, for each generation, there is an indirect welfare effect due to the labor
adjustment of the subsequent generation. Our channels are closely related to the decomposition
in Fehr et al. (1999), who apply generational accounting techniques in a setup that is similar
to ours. However, in sharp contrast to Fehr et al. (1999), we do not proceed by parameterizing
and calibrating the deep structure of the model to carry out welfare analysis.
Grouping the overall welfare gain by generations and expressing λot+1 in terms of λ
y
t using










































1 + χt,t+1/Rt+1 is often used to evaluate the effectiveness of social security systems, because it
relates the return of the social security system, 1 + χt,t+1, to the return on the capital market
Rt+1. A more detailed discussion of the different components of the overall welfare effect and
their relation to the concept of dynamic inefficiency is provided in appendix A.
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Given the welfare effect in (14) or (15), the standard approach in the literature is to proceed
by parameterizing the deep structure of the model, i.e., impose functional form assumptions on
preferences and the aggregate production function and express dW/dτ as a function of a set of
primitives that need to be calibrated or estimated from the data. In this paper, we follow an
alternative strategy. We make use of the fact that equations (14) and (15) are a function of
(i) {dwt/dτ, dnt/dτ}t=0,...,∞, (ii) marginal utilities and (iii) economic quantities such as hours
worked and wages. Put differently, in order to identify and estimate dW/dτ , it is sufficient
to know quantities (i) to (iii). The key point is that knowledge of the deep parameters that
generate these quantities is not required and, thus, a full specification of the deep structure of
the model can be avoided.
We argue in section 3 that (i) can be identified and estimated using a reduced form VAR
and that empirical predictions can be used to compute (iii). The remaining challenge is to
identify the marginal utilities empirically. We propose two alternative approaches. In section
2.4, we show that it is possible to compute first order approximations for the consumption
equivalent impact of a marginal change in the payroll tax for each generation without further
assumptions on preferences. Identification and estimation of the overall effect dW/dτ requires
more assumptions because comparisons of marginal utilities between different generations are
involved. In particular, we need to partly parameterize household preferences as discussed in
section 2.5.
2.3 Extensions
In the empirical part of this paper, we focus on implementing the formula for the overall welfare
effect given in equation (14). This formula is based on a simple model framework. However, our
framework can be extended along various dimensions. We consider two such extensions in the
appendix. In appendix B, we show how our analysis can be augmented to include additional
taxes (e.g., consumption and capital taxes) that are used to refinance the social security system.
Specifically, we consider a government that levies a consumption tax, τ c, in addition to the
payroll tax, τw. Social security transfers are given by
Tt = ntwtτ
w









where we set pt = 1 to alleviate the exposition. We show that one can use similar arguments as
in the previous section to derive formulas for the overall welfare effects dW/dτc and dW/dτw .
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In Appendix C, we show how to incorporate changes in the retirement age into the analysis.
Such changes can be introduced in the model by assuming that old households work for a fraction
% of a model period before they retire (e.g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2012). We show that
dW/dτ is given by a similar expression as (14). The difference is that labor supply decisions of
the old household need to be taken into account, while the direct and general equilibrium effects
on the working old cancel with the corresponding increase in transfers.
Moreover, instead of a permanent change, we could also look at a one time change in the tax
rate τ . In this case, the analysis could proceed by extending the theoretical results by Gonzalez-
Eiras and Niepelt (2007, appendix A). As argued before, we consider a permanent change to be
the more realistic and interesting scenario and we do not pursue the one time change further.
2.4 Consumption equivalent impact on each generation
In this section, we are interested in estimating the consumption equivalent effect of a marginal
increase in τ . Suppose that there is a hypothetical increase in co by φ percent. Utility of the
generation born in t would then be given by u(cyt , n̄ − nt, (1 + φt)cot+1). A first order Taylor
approximation around φt = 0 yields
u(cyt , n̄− nt, (1 + φt)cot+1) ≈ u(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1) + uco(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1)cot+1φt.
The change in utility can therefore be approximated by
u(cyt , n̄− nt, (1 + φt)cot+1)− u(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1) ≈ λot+1cot+1φt.
It follows from equations (14) and (15) that the change in a generation’s utility due to the
change in τ is linear in this generation’s marginal utility. In particular, the change in utility
can be written as λot+1Ωt, where Ωt is defined in Proposition 1. For each generation, we can
approximatively calculate the (hypothetical) percentage change in consumption when retired
which would make this generation equally well off as the policy change:
λot+1c
o
t+1φt ≈ λot+1Ωt. (16)






This yields the approximative welfare effect of the policy change in terms of consumption for
each generation.
Proposition 1. Consider an OLG economy as described in section 2.1 with a PAYGO social
security system. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then, the impact of a permanent
marginal change in τ on the welfare of the generation born in t is equivalent (up to a first-


































for t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Observe that equations (18) and (19) contain impulse response functions with respect to a
permanent change in the payroll tax rate, {dwt/dτ, dnt/dτ}j=0,...,∞, predictions of economic
quantities, projected working age population growth, and the projected ratio of workers to
retirees. This allows for an implementation based on a reduced form VAR model. We provide a
more detailed discussion of the implementation in section 3.
2.5 Overall welfare effect
Proposition 1 allows for an approximate welfare analysis by generation in terms of consumption
equivalents. However, for a thorough policy evaluation, this information is not sufficient because
the Ramsey planner cares about a weighted sum of all future generations’ utilities. Thus,
knowledge of the overall effect of a change in the payroll tax is essential. Because utility is not
assumed to be quasi-linear, we need to convert dW/dτ into a money metric (Chetty, 2009). We
obtain an intuitive metric by normalizing the welfare change given an increase in the payroll
tax rate by the welfare gain from a hypothetical additional unit of income, a0, of the initial old
13


















































An assessment of the overall effect dW/dτ requires aggregating generation-specific welfare
effects. This aggregation inherently includes a comparison of weighted marginal utilities between
different generations and, therefore, requires some additional structure on marginal utilities,
λot+1, and welfare weights, ξt. We impose the following assumption on the household utility
function.
Assumption 2. Household preferences are additively separable over time and flow utility of the
old households is of CRRA type, i.e.,
u(cyt , n̄− nt, cot+1) = u(c
y






where β is the individual discount factor and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Assumption 2 implies that the ratio of marginal utilities is a function of quantities that can be
predicted empirically, namely gross consumption growth and p, which depends on working age













As a final step towards implementing equation (20), we need to impose some structure on
the welfare weights, ξt. In principle, any sequence of welfare weights can be chosen, provided
that the sequence is declining sufficiently fast for the problem to be well defined. Following the
literature (e.g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008) we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3. The social planner’s welfare weights for different generations reflect the size of
the generations, aging, and discounting (with discount factor κ < 1):





with ξ−1 = 1.
The generation born in t is of size Lt when young and of size Ltpt+1 when old. With discounting,
this generation’s weight is proportional to Lt(1 + κpt+1). These considerations imply relative
weights across generations as described in Assumption 3. In appendix D, we consider a different
set of weights that allows us to estimate the welfare cost solely caused by increasing the distortive
tax and excluding redistribution effects.
We are now in the position to summarize the empirically implementable formula for the
welfare consequences of a change in the payroll tax in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider an OLG economy as described in section 2.1 with a PAYGO social
security system. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then, the overall welfare gain from
a permanent increase in the payroll tax τ relative to a $1.00 increase in the income of the initial




































































Apart from γ and κ, the quantities in equation (22) are either observable or can be estimated. As
for the approximate consumption equivalent formulas in Proposition 1, equation (22) contains
impulse response functions, predictions of economic quantities, projected population growth, and
the projected ratio of workers to retirees. In addition, consumption growth must be projected
to infer the ratios of marginal utilities. Given these similarities, implementation can be based
on the same reduced form VAR estimates. We refer to section 3 for more details.
3 Empirical implementation
We illustrate our method for computing the welfare consequences of a change in the payroll tax by
analyzing the social security system in the United States.9 First, the empirical implementation
of Propositions 1 and 2 is discussed. Second, we describe the data and the aggregation to the
frequency of the OLG model. Finally, we present the results and some robustness checks.
9See, e.g., Feldstein (2005) for a description of the social security system in the United States.
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3.1 Methodology
Proposition 1 provides formulas for the percentage change in consumption when retired which
would make a generation equally well off as the change in the payroll tax rate. Proposition 2
provides a formula for the overall welfare effect of a change in the payroll tax rate. The quantities
needed to empirically estimate the equations in these propositions can be divided into four
groups.
Payroll tax. In the United States, payroll taxes for social security can be split into the
designated purposes of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI) and
Hospital Insurance (HI). Given the setup of our model, only payroll taxes used to fund the
PAYGO system are considered. Thus, we take τ to be the payroll tax for OASI. We evaluate
equations (18), (19) and (22) at the current level of τ = 0.106.
Impulse responses of hours worked and factor prices. The welfare effect depends on the
dynamic responses of labor and wages with respect to a change in the payroll tax rate. A natural
way to estimate these dynamic responses consists in estimating impulse response functions based
on a reduced form VAR model:
Yt = c+ Φ1Yt−1 + . . .+ ΦpYt−p + θ0∆τt + . . .+ θq∆τt−q +
∑
i
αiDi,t + εt. (23)
Yt is a vector of endogenous variables. Φj , c, θj and αi are matrices and vectors of coefficients.
εt is a vector of error terms which is multivariate white noise. We estimate a four-dimensional
VAR model with p = q = 3 using quarterly data on growth rates of hours worked per capita, real
wages, real consumption per capita and real GDP per capita. These growth rates are stationary.
We include a set of dummy variablesDi,t to control for the potential impact of important changes
in the US economy or the social security system.10
The VAR order of 3 is chosen based on residual autocorrelation tests and the Akaike in-
formation criterion. We include the change in the payroll tax rate as an exogenous variable.
Our identifying assumption is that E[εt∆τt|Yt−1, . . . , Yt−p, ∆τt−1, . . . ,∆τt−q, Di,t] = 0, i.e., ∆τt
is exogenous conditional on lagged economic quantities. Clearly, the payroll tax rate depends
on factors such as life expectancy, retirement age and the shape of the age pyramid. However,
10The dummies are equal to zero before a certain event and equal to one thenceforward. The following eco-
nomic, political and social security related events are considered: Cost-of-living allowance (1972q2), expansion of
the social security program (1972q4), oil crisis (1973q4), social security amendments (1977q4), oil crisis (1979q1),
disability amendments (1980q2), social security and medicare amendments (1983q2), Great Moderation (1984q1),
Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act (1984q4), Dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991q4), Contract With
America Advancement Act (1996q1), Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act (1999q4), burst of
dot-com bubble (2000q1), Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act (2000q2), financial crisis (2007q3).
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the factors influencing ∆τt are unlikely to have a direct impact on Yt conditional on the lagged
values of Y . Even if the payroll tax rate is adjusted to macroeconomic conditions, our identifying
assumption is unlikely to be violated. Because we have quarterly data and ∆τt is determined
by legislation, which takes some time to adjust, ∆τt is likely to respond with a lag. Thus, we
are confident that ∆τt is mean independent of εt conditional on lagged values of Y . To provide
some evidence for our identifying assumption, we perform a Granger causality test by including
∆τt as an endogenous variable in the VAR model. We find that ∆τt is exogenous in the sense
that it cannot be predicted using lagged values of Y .
A permanent change in τt corresponds to a one time change in ∆τt. The impulse response








+ . . .+ Φp
dYt−p+j
d∆τt




+ . . .+ Φp
dYt−p+j
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for j = q + 1, q + 2, . . .
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where dYkd∆τt = 0 for k < t.
Forecasts. The empirical implementation of equations (18), (19) and (22) requires forecasts
for present and future generations on real wages, real interest rates, labor, working age popu-
lation growth, the ratio of workers to retirees, and consumption of retirees. Because long-term
forecasting is a very delicate issue, we conduct a scenario analysis to account for the uncertainty
of future developments (see section 3.3.4).11 The baseline scenario is constructed as follows.
Real wages, hours worked and real consumption of retirees are projected using the (geometric)
mean growth rate of the observed data. The projected real interest rate is set to the mean of
the observed data. For the working age population, we base the projections on the (geomet-
ric) mean growth rate according to the national population projections released by the U.S.
Census Bureau.12 Regarding the ratio of workers to retirees, we also rely on the national popu-
lation projections, which are available up to 2060, and we assume the ratio to remain constant
afterwards.
Parameters. We avoid identification and estimation of the parameters κ and γ. Instead, we
11At first sight, the dependency on forecasts seems to be a limitation pertaining specifically to our proposed
method. However, a similar difficulty also exists for specific parameterized and calibrated models. A permanent
change in τt leads to a new steady state. Once this steady state is reached, the economy grows along the balanced
growth path. Thus, the welfare evaluation of a payroll tax change in a parameterized and calibrated model hinges
on technology and population growth for current and future generations, which is similarly hard to assess as to
forecast the quantities needed to implement equations (18), (19) and (22).
12http://www.census.gov/population/projections/data/national/2012/downloadablefiles.html, last
accessed on May 6, 2014.
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estimate equation (22) for various plausible parameter values.
3.2 Data and aggregation
This section provides a brief description of the data used to implement our formula. More details
are relegated to appendix E. To estimate our VAR, we use growth rates on hours worked per
capita, real wages, real consumption per capita, and real GDP per capita. The series on hours
worked per capita is constructed from an index of hours worked in the business sector divided by
the working population. In accordance to hours worked, we compute real wages from real hourly
compensation in the business sector. We measure the consumption growth rate by the growth
rate of real private final consumption expenditure divided by the total population size. The
data on real GDP come from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. To implement our formula,
we also need data on consumption of the old generation and population quantities (working age
population growth and the ratio of workers to retirees). The former series is constructed from
yearly data on total average expenditures of people over age 65. Data and projections on the
latter quantities are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau.
We cannot directly plug these data into equations (18), (19) and (22) in order to evaluate the
PAYGO system. Particular attention has to be paid to the aggregation of the data in order to fit
the framework of the OLG model. In the OLG model, two time periods correspond to an entire
lifespan. Following the literature (e.g. Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008; Song, 2011), we take
one period in the model to be 30 years. Period 0 in equations (18), (19) and (22) corresponds
to the years 2013 to 2042, period 1 to the years 2043 to 2072, etc. We carefully explain our
strategy on how to aggregate the data to fit the theoretical model in appendix E.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 VAR
Figure 1 plots the responses of hours worked and real wages to a permanent increase in the
payroll tax rate by one percentage point. After some quarters of adjustment, both hours worked
and real wages stabilize at a lower level.
The responses are in line with theoretical predictions from a standard OLG model. A
permanent increase in taxes reduces the income of young households while the associated rise
in transfers increases the income of old households. Thus, savings and, hence, the capital stock
decrease, which has a negative impact on real wages. Given the decrease in real pre-tax wages
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and the even more pronounced drop in after tax wages, the substitution effect calls for a reduction
in labor. If the substitution effect outweighs the income effect, hours worked drop.
In order to implement equations (18), (19) and (22), we need the impulse responses dwt/dτ
and dnt/dτ at the model frequency of 30 years. Using our estimated quarterly impulse responses,
we first compute quarterly level responses of wages and hours by subtracting the projected path
for these variables absent any shock from the projected path given the increase in the payroll
tax rate. Consistently with data aggregation (cf. table 6 in appendix E), the quarterly level
responses are then aggregated to match the OLG model frequency. Figure 2 shows the resulting
level responses at model frequency. Hours worked decline by a small amount. The response
amounts to minus 180 hours for the initial generation, which means a reduction of labor by 0.5
hours per month. The real hourly wage decreases by 19 cents for the initial generation. After
some adjustment period, the level response declines in absolute terms (for hours worked) or
grows (for wages) in accordance with the long-run growth rates of these variables.































Figure 1: Impulse response of hours worked and real wages (in percent) to a permanent increase in the payroll
tax rate by one percentage point.
3.3.2 Consumption equivalent impact
The impulse response functions estimated above and predictions of economic quantities allow for
calculating the impact of the payroll tax change on each generation. Proposition 1 shows how
the change in utility of each generation can be approximately expressed in terms of a percentage
change in consumption during retirement. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Several results deserve closer attention. First, the largest part of the impact (in absolute
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Figure 2: Impulse response of hours worked and real wages to a permanent increase in the payroll tax rate by
one percentage point.
values) is due to the direct effect. The change in the payroll tax rate has a direct consumption
equivalent effect of 0.95% for the initial old generation. The corresponding direct effect for the
initial young and the future generations is negative. Thus, receiving more transfers when retired
does not fully compensate for having to pay more taxes when working. This result matches the
data which indicate that the US economy is dynamically efficient. Second, the factor price effect
is substantial. For all generations, this effect amounts to about 60% of the direct effect’s size.
Note that the factor price effect is of the same sign and, hence, amplifies the direct effect. The
factor price effect can be further decomposed into the effect due to changes of wages when young,
wages when old and interest rates. This decomposition reveals that changes in the interest rate
and changes in the wage level during the working age are important. In contrast, changes in
the wage level when retired, which affect the level of transfers paid to retirees, are of minor
importance. Third, the payroll tax change has a negative impact on labor and therefore on
transfers, but this labor effect seems to be of minor quantitative relevance.
The findings in Table 1 have important implications for the welfare evaluation of PAYGO
systems. The results indicate a distributional conflict across generations. We find that the
initial old generation benefits, while all other generations are worse off. As the factor price
effects go in the same direction as the direct effects, the distributional conflict due to differences
in direct benefits and costs across generations is amplified. The retirees get more transfers and
they also benefit from higher interest rates on their savings. The other generations are worse
off because receiving more transfers does not fully compensate for paying more taxes, and they
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Table 1: Percentage retiree’s consumption change with equivalent welfare effect as the policy change.
generation 0 generation 1 generation 2 generation 3
direct effect 0.95 -0.34 -0.36 -0.39
factor price effect 0.58 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24
labor effect -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
total effect 1.47 -0.59 -0.65 -0.70
The numbers represent the average percentage change in consumption during retirement over
a generation, of which a fraction (1− p) does not survive to become old households while the
remaining fraction p gets 1/p times the numbers in the table.
also suffer from overall unfavorable factor price changes. In addition to the direct and the factor
price effects, there is a negative labor effect for all generations. This can be interpreted as
a consumption equivalent cost of increasing a distorting tax. Overall, we conclude that it is
not sufficient to consider only the direct redistribution effects of a policy change in the PAYGO
system because there are indirect effects of the tax change which seem to have substantial welfare
impacts.
3.3.3 Overall welfare effect
The previous section presents an analysis of the approximate welfare impact for each generation.
Since one generation is better and others are worse off, it is important to have a measure
which aggregates the utility changes of all generations in order to evaluate the policy change.
Proposition 2 provides such a measure. In this section, we use equation (22) to evaluate the
PAYGO social security system of the United States.
In principle, we can calculate the overall welfare impact for any given sequence of welfare
weights {ξt}. The first column in Table 2 shows the results for a “politician’s welfare weights”,
i.e., welfare weights reflecting the size of the current old and young generation, with zero weight
for all generations not yet born. All other columns in Table 2 show the results if we put the
structure provided in Assumption 3 on {ξt}. The results depend on the unobservable parameters
γ and κ. As there is some disagreement on γ in the literature, we estimate equation (22) for
a variety of values covering the range of parameter values commonly used in the literature.
The decision on the social planner’s discount factor across generations, κ, is inherently and
necessarily the researchers’ choice. To avoid an arbitrary choice, we assume that the planner’s
discount factor is similar to the one of individual households. In particular, we analyze the
welfare change for values γ ∈ [0, 2] and κ ∈ [0.930, 0.98530], where the latter interval stems from
21
assuming κ = β with an individual yearly discount factor β of at least 0.9 and at most 0.985.13
Table 2 shows the result for a selection of parameter values. We emphasize that each entry
in the table corresponds to a different problem from the planner’s point of view. The planner
knows the utility function of the households including a specific value of γ. The parameter
γ matters for the overall welfare evaluation because it affects marginal utility. As we project
consumption to grow, future generations will have lower marginal utility. How much marginal
utility shrinks across generations depends on γ. If γ is large, the consumption loss of future
generations is of low relative importance for overall welfare compared to the consumption gain
of the initial old generation. However, as the numbers in Table 2 indicate, exact knowledge of
the households’ coefficient of relative risk aversion γ seems to be not that important for the
overall welfare effect, except for large values of κ. The larger κ, the more relative weight is given
to future generations. As Table 1 shows, the current generation of retirees benefits from the
policy change whereas the other generations are negatively affected. Thus, the overall welfare
effect crucially depends on κ. The overall effect is positive for low values of κ, in which case γ
is of minor relevance. For large values of κ, the overall effect becomes negative provided that γ
is not too large.
Table 2: Overall welfare effect (in 10000) according to (22) depending on the households’ parameter γ and the
planner’s weights {ξt}∞t=0.
“Politician’s {ξt}” κ = 0.930 κ = 0.9530 κ = 0.98530
γ = 0.0 -3.5 5.0 4.2 -80.6
γ = 0.5 -2.6 5.1 4.3 -9.3
γ = 1.0 -1.7 5.1 4.4 -2.3
γ = 1.5 -1.0 5.1 4.5 0.3
γ = 2.0 -0.3 5.1 4.6 1.7
The overall welfare change includes both redistribution and efficiency effects. In appendix D,
we estimate the magnitude of the efficiency effect based on a hypothetical government authority
in the spirit of the lump-sum redistribution authority (LSRA) in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
To understand the driving factors of the numbers in Table 2, it is instructive to decompose
the values by channels and generations. In section 2, we have shown that the welfare consequence
of a change in the payroll tax is the sum of three different components: the direct change in
taxes and transfers, the welfare impact via changes in the wage and interest rate, and the
13For the planner’s problem to be well defined, we need the sequence of welfare weights {ξt} to decline
sufficiently fast. For this reason, κ cannot be too close to one. We verify that the expression in (22) indeed
converges for our upper boundary of κ in our empirical application.
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welfare impact via changes in labor. As a benchmark case, Table 3 shows the results of this
decomposition for κ = 0.9530 and γ = 1. Of course, the sign of the numbers in Table 3 is identical
with the sign of the numbers in Table 1. However, in contrast to Table 1, future generations are




> 1 for t > 0, which implies
lower marginal utility for future generations.
The sum of the labor effects across generations is negative for each considered combination
of parameter values for γ and κ. The sum of the factor price effects is positive except for
κ = 0.98530 and γ < 1.5. The same holds for the sum of the direct welfare effects. Thus, the
sign of the overall welfare effect depends crucially on the direct and on the factor price effect,
which may be positive or negative depending on the parameter values.
Table 3: Decomposition of the overall welfare effect (in 1000) by generations and channels, based on parameter
values γ = 1 and κ = 0.9530.
gen. 0 gen. 1 gen. 2 gen. 3 total
direct effect 33.3 -3.1 -0.8 -0.2 29.1
factor price effect 20.3 -1.9 -0.5 -0.1 17.8
labor effect -1.8 -0.5 -0.1 -0.0 -2.4
total 51.9 -5.5 -1.5 -0.4 44.5
It is important to recall that our results are only locally valid. Equation (22) captures the
marginal effect of a change in the payroll tax as a function of macroeconomic variables and, in
particular, of τ . Thus, the results presented in this section provide a welfare evaluation of the
current PAYGO system in the United States (with τ = 0.106). This is especially important
when comparing our result to the findings in the literature based on structural models, which
typically do not analyze marginal changes. For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) analyze
the welfare effects of the introduction of an unfunded social security system with 60 percent
benefit-to-earnings replacement rate under different tax regimes. Similar to our results, they
find gains for the older generations and losses for the younger and future generations. Using
the same model, Fehr et al. (1999) study a 25% increase in social security benefits starting with
a PAYGO system with a 40% benefit replacement rate and decompose the overall effect into
different channels. Despite the differences in the underlying policy experiment and the modeling
framework, their decomposition shows a qualitatively similar pattern as reported in tables 1
and 3. Using an applied general equilibrium model, Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) find the optimal
replacement rate of an unfunded social security system to be 30% (as opposed the empirically
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more realistic rate of 60%). Moreover, their results indicate that even with an empirically
realistic replacement rate of 60% a social security system can be welfare enhancing. Kotlikoff
et al. (2007) consider different alternative policies to mitigate the problems of the demographic
transition in the United States. One such policy consists of a 50% benefit reduction which helps
to limit the (endogenous) growth in the payroll tax. Their simulations show welfare losses for
the older and the present generations and welfare gains for the future generations. Because in
our model a benefit reduction is directly linked to a tax cut through the government budget
constraint, these results are qualitatively comparable to our welfare projections. At this point
it is noteworthy that instead of focusing on the payroll tax rate as the policy instrument, our
analysis could alternatively be based on the benefit rates.
3.3.4 Robustness checks
Knowledge of the future development of real wages, hours worked, real interest rates, consump-
tion of retirees, working age population growth, and the ratio of workers to retirees is crucial
for the evaluation of PAYGO systems based on equations (18), (19) and (22). As a baseline
scenario, we use means or mean growth rates of the available data sample for forecasting.14
In the light of structural breaks, this might be an inappropriate forecast to use given that we
need projections for several future generations. Therefore, this section conducts a sensitivity
analysis on the dependence of our findings on the projected paths for the relevant variables.
Using scenarios to account for the uncertainty of future developments is quite common in the
literature on social security systems (e.g., Pecchenino and Utendorf, 1999; Kotlikoff et al., 2007;
Imrohoroglu and Kitao, 2009; McGrattan and Prescott, 2013).
In addition to the baseline scenario, we consider a higher and a lower future development
for each variable of interest. Figure 3 depicts the alternative paths. We cover a wide range of
possible developments. For time series with a positive (negative) trend in levels,15 the high (low)
scenario is constructed assuming a 50% higher growth rate compared to the baseline. The low
(high) scenario consists in eliminating the trend and assuming the series to be constant. For
the working age population, the U.S. Census Bureau provides a low, middle and high projection
based on alternative net international migration series. We use the (geometric) mean growth
rate according to the low and high projection in order to construct our low and high scenario for
14There are two exceptions: the working age population growth rate and the ratio of workers to retirees, for
which the forecast is based on the national population projections from the U.S. Census Bureau.
15Real wages and real consumption per capita of retirees show a positive trend, hours worked per capita and
the ratio of workers to retirees show a negative trend.
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the working age population growth rate.16 Finally, since the real interest rate has no trend, the
high (low) scenario is constructed by adding (subtracting) 0.1 percentage points to the (yearly)
baseline real interest rate per generation.17
For each scenario, we compute the consumption equivalent impact (equations (18) and (19))
and the overall welfare effect (equation (22)) for various parameter values κ and γ (i.e., we
recompute the Tables 1 and 2).18
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Figure 3: Different scenarios for the future development of variables affecting the welfare change. The solid line
represents the baseline, the dashed lines indicate the high and low scenarios.
Table 4: Overall welfare effect (in 10000) according to (22) for different scenarios, based on parameter values
κ = 0.9530 and γ = 1.
real wages hours worked retirees’ consumption workers to retirees population growth real interest rate
high 5.3 4.7 4.5 6.4 4.5 4.3
baseline 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
low 3.3 4.3 4.2 3.7 4.4 4.5
Overall, our results are robust regarding changes in the future development of macroeconomic
variables. For all scenarios, the sign of the consumption equivalent impact is identical to Table 1
for each channel and generation (up to 11 generations). Moreover, although there are some
quantitative differences, the overall welfare effect is stable over many of the scenarios for many
parameter combinations. Table 4 summarizes the overall welfare effect for the different scenarios
16Note that Figure 3 depicts working age population growth over generations of 30 years. For example, the
long-run baseline forecast of 12.8% would translate into an average yearly growth rate of 0.4%.
17Note that Figure 3 depicts the net real interest rate over generations of 30 years. For example, the long-run
baseline forecast of net 108.2% interest would translate into an average yearly net interest rate of 2.5%.
18For some of the high scenarios, we cannot conduct the analysis for the combination of parameter values
κ = 0.98530 and γ ≤ 0.5 because, in these cases, the sequence of welfare weights does not converge fast enough
to zero for the problem to be well defined.
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for the case of κ = 0.9530 and γ = 1. For this combination of parameter values, all scenarios
yield a very similar result. The future evolution of wages and the ratio of workers to retirees seem
to be more relevant for the overall welfare effect than the development of the other variables.
For large values of κ, the overall welfare effect is less stable across the scenarios. In particular,
there are some cases in which the sign changes. In the low scenario for the real interest rate,
the overall welfare effect becomes positive for all parameter values of γ considered. In the low
scenario for consumption of retirees, the overall welfare effect becomes negative.
If we use the “politician’s welfare weights” instead of Assumption 3, the overall welfare effect
is also more sensitive to the future development of the relevant variables. In particular, the
overall effect gets positive in case of high real wage growth and, for some values of γ, also in a
few other scenarios.
4 Conclusion
Old-age provision constitutes an essential element of many developed countries’ social insurance
programs. As demographic changes cause increasing financial stress for PAYGO systems, reforms
of existing systems become more and more relevant.
This paper proposes a complementary method for the welfare analysis of PAYGO social
security systems. Based on an OLG model featuring endogenous labor supply and idiosyncratic
longevity, we derive a simple formula for the local welfare consequences of a permanent change
in the payroll tax. In addition, we show how to extend this formula to incorporate different
taxes to finance the PAYGO system and changes in the pension age.
We propose two different approaches to implement our formula, both of which are based on
predictions for different key quantities of the model and the reduced form estimates of a VAR.
Using data for the United States, we estimate a positive effect of a marginal increase in the
payroll tax for most of the parameters values we consider. The sign of the overall effect stems
from positive effects for today’s retirees that outweigh the welfare losses for today’s workers and
future generations. To this end, our findings indicate that changing the payroll tax induces a
distributional conflict across generations. A detailed decomposition by channels and generations
sheds light on the driving forces behind this result. The direct effect through changes in the
tax rate and social security benefits as well as the general equilibrium effects through changes
in factor prices are the predominant determinants of the overall welfare effect while the effect
of adjustment in individual labor supply is of minor importance. Robustness checks based on a
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scenario analysis confirm the robustness of our results.
Compared to the traditional approach to welfare analysis based on calibrated and estimated
structural models, our method does neither require knowledge of the deep structure of the
model nor does it rely on the estimation of this structure. In particular, we do not require
a full parameterization of household preferences, a specification of the aggregate production
function, or knowledge on individuals’ savings behavior, nor do we attempt to estimate the
structural parameters. Instead, the welfare consequences of a change in the payroll tax can
be deduced from reduced form estimates under weaker, more transparent, and arguably more
credible assumptions.
Regarding the sufficient statistics literature in microeconomics, our analysis extends the
range of applications to macroeconomic dynamic general equilibrium models and highlights the
challenges associated with deriving and implementing sufficient statistics in these models. The
basic idea of deriving sufficient statistics in dynamic general equilibrium models and estimating
them using time series models can be applied in different settings and is an interesting direction
for further research.
Our approach shares two important limitations: First, our results are only locally valid. In
particular, the analysis of real world payroll tax changes would require additional assumptions
due to the discrete (and not infinitesimal) nature of these policy changes. Second, a new formula
needs to be derived for every research question. In particular, it is not possible to use the same
formula for the analysis of mixed social security systems or to compare different pension systems
(e.g., funded and unfunded systems). In the light of these limitations, we consider our method
to be complementary to the structural approach, because it allows for a weakening of some of
the required assumptions on the one hand, but it only applies to the specific question of welfare
consequences of payroll tax changes in PAYGO systems on the other hand.
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A Components of the overall welfare effect and relation to dy-
namic inefficiency
As shown in section 2.2, a change in the payroll tax rate affects welfare through three distinct
channels: a direct redistribution effect, an effect through changes in factor prices, and an effect
due to the labor adjustment of the subsequent generations.
The sign of the direct redistribution component of the overall welfare effect is related to
the dynamic inefficiency of the economy. If the economy is dynamically inefficient, then the
redistribution from young to old households, which is induced by the increase in the payroll tax
rate, benefits not only the initial old, but also the other generations. Neglecting the response of



















If the expression in parentheses is positive, then generations other than the initial old are also
better off due to the direct redistribution. In a steady state with nt+1nt = 1 and
wt+1
wt
= 1 + g,19
this is the case if
−1 + (1 + g)(1 + χ)
R
> 0
⇔ −(1− δ + fK) + (1 + g)(1 + χ) > 0
⇔ δ + χ+ g + χg > fK . (26)
This is exactly the condition for dynamic inefficiency, which is given by the marginal product of
capital being smaller than the depreciation rate plus the growth rate of the economy.
The sign of the factor price component is also related to the dynamic inefficiency of the
economy. Neglecting the direct redistribution effects and the response of nt in equation (15) for
























In a steady state with nt+1nt = 1 and
dwt+1
dτ = (1 + g)
dwt
dτ , the expression in parentheses is given










If the economy is dynamically inefficient, the factor price effect is of opposite sign than dw/dτ .























Thus, the sign of the labor adjustment component equals the sign of dnt/dτ . Unsurprisingly,
there is a negative impact on welfare if an increase in the distorting tax on labor leads to a
reduction in hours worked.
B Extension I: consumption tax
Our analysis can directly be extended to include additional taxes (e.g., consumption and capital
taxes) to refinance the PAYGO system. Consider, for example, adding a consumption tax to
the model. To clarify the notation, denote the payroll tax as τw and the consumption tax as τ c.
Social security transfers are given by
Tt = ntwtτ
w









where we set pt = 1 to simplify the exposition.
Similar arguments as before yield the following formula for the welfare effect of a permanent







































































These formulas differ from equation (14) through the last sum that also includes the dynamic
reactions of consumption with respect to the tax rates, which was absent in the analysis before.
Moreover, the direct effect is scaled by cyt in the case of a change in the consumption tax whereas
it is scaled by wtnt in the formula for a change in the payroll tax rate.
In our empirical application for the US, we do not implement the above formulas because
there is no consumption tax on the federal level. We stress, however, that implementing exten-
sions of our formula in equation (14) is an interesting topic for future research.
C Extension II: retirement age
Our analysis can be extended to allow for changes in retirement age. The household problem
is modified in the following way. Old households work for a fraction %t of the model period
before they reach retirement age. An increase in %t therefore corresponds to an increase in the
retirement age. This setup includes the main model of this paper as a special case: If %t = 0,
then old households do not work at all. To simplify the exposition, we set pt = 1.
























The first order conditions read:
λyt = ucy(c
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Transfer payments to old households are equal to the tax revenues:
Tt = wtτt(n
y
t (1 + χt−1,t) + n
o
t%t). (34)






Similar arguments as in the main text yield the following formula for the welfare effect of a


























































































































which pertains to the labor response of old households. The explanation for the small difference
between the equations (14) and (37) is very intuitive. In the extended model, old households have
to pay payroll taxes until they reach the retirement age, but these tax payments are refunded to
the same old households after retirement. Thus, there is no redistributive effect of a change in
τ beyond the one in the main model. However, old households may adjust their hours of work
in response to a change in the distorting payroll tax rate, which has an impact on welfare.20
In our empirical application for the US, we do not implement formula (37) due to data
limitations. In particular, we would need reliable data on hours worked by age groups in order
to estimate {dnyt /dτ}t=0,...,∞ and {dnot/dτ}t=0,..., ∞. Nevertheless, (37) allows for analyzing
how the welfare effect of a change in τ depends on the retirement age %t. If {dnot/dτ}t=0,...,∞ is
negative, then an increase in the retirement age negatively affects both overall dW/dτ and the
welfare effect on each generation (and vice versa if {dnot/dτ}t=0,...,∞ is positive). Intuitively, the
more years people work before they retire, the more important the welfare cost of a reduction
in hours worked due to the increase in the distortionary payroll tax rate becomes.
20This adjustment is a consequence of the fact that households are small, i.e., they do not take into account
that their choice of not+1 affects their own pension transfers Tt+1.
34
D Lump-sum redistribution authority
The overall welfare change includes both redistribution and efficiency effects. To assess the
importance of the efficiency effects, we consider an additional, hypothetical government au-
thority in the spirit of the lump-sum redistribution authority (LSRA) in Auerbach and Kot-
likoff (1987). Suppose that, in each period t, the LSRA makes a lump-sum transfer of wtnt −
dwt




wtnt − dwtdτ nt(1− τ)
)
on each old household. In this hypothetical case, only the terms
related to dndτ remain in equation (15). To make each generation as well off as before the policy




old household in period t. The present discounted value of these additional transfer payments








dτ wkτ(1 + χ−1,k)
Πkj=1Rj
. (38)










for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (40)
With these welfare weights, dW/dτ is exactly equal to the quantity in (38), which provides a
measure of the efficiency costs of the change in τ .
In our empirical application for the US, we can estimate the efficiency cost of the change
in τ by using the welfare weights (39) and (40). In present value terms, this efficiency cost
amounts to USD 4449 per household (both young and old) in t = 0. This cost is cleaned up
from redistribution effects and solely caused by increasing the distortive payroll tax.
E Data and aggregation
We use quarterly data from 1964 to 2010 to estimate the VAR described in section 3.1. The
years 2011 to 2013 are excluded because there were adjustments in the payroll tax rate for which
it is unclear how, if at all, they fit into our analysis. For 2011 and 2012, the payroll tax rate was
temporarily reduced, but the reduction in tax revenue was made up by transfers from the general
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fund of the Treasury. Thus, there was a reduction in payroll taxes, but no corresponding change
in the receipts of the social security system. As our model does not include a government besides
the social security system, we cannot properly cover this temporary reduction in τt financed by
the general fund of the Treasury. Therefore, we exclude this period from our estimation sample
and use data until 2010 only.
Table 5 contains a description of the data that are used for estimating the VAR model or
needed to implement equations (18), (19) and (22). Table 6 explains the data aggregation to
the OLG model frequency for the variables appearing in equations (18), (19) and (22).
Table 5: Description of the Data
Variable Description
nt Number of hours worked per capita per quarter. The series is constructed using an index
of hours worked in the business sector (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics), scaled up to
match total hours worked in the base year and divided by the number of people between
15 and 65 years (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics).
wt Real hourly wage (in 2010 dollars). In correspondence with nt, we use an index of real
hourly compensation in the business sector (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics), scaled to
match average hourly earnings of all employees in the total private sector in 2010.
Rt Real interest rate. The series is constructed using the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity
Rate (source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) as nominal long-term
interest rate. Our inflation measure is based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics).
cot Real consumption of retirees (in 2010 dollars). The series is constructed by deflating
yearly data on total average expenditures of people over age 65 (source: Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey).
χt−1,t Growth rate of the working age population (16 to 64 years) (source: Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and Census Bureau).
Ratio of workers
to retirees
Size of the working age population (16 to 64 years) divided by the size of the retiree
population (65 and over) (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Census Bureau).
real consumption
per capita growth
Growth rate of real Private Final Consumption Expenditure in United States (source:
OECD National Accounts Statistics) divided by total population (source: U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Census Bureau).
real GDP per
capita growth
Growth rate of real GDP (source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis).
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Table 6: Aggregation of higher frequency data to OLG frequency of 30 years
Variable Aggregation
nt Quarterly data are added up over 30 years in order to get the number of
hours worked per capita over 30 years.
wt The average real hourly wage over 30 years is computed.
Rt The real long-term gross interest rate per annum is projected to 30 years
(i.e., R30y = R30p.a.).
cot Annual data are added up over 30 years in order to get total real con-
sumption per capita over 30 years.
χt−1,t For each 30 year window, the average size of the working age population
is computed. This series is then used to compute the growth rate of the
working age population.
pt pt is computed by dividing (1 + χt−1,t) by the average ratio of workers
to retirees for each 30 year window.
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